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A merican workers are working harder for less, with productiv-ity rising but living standards stagnant or declining.1 At the 
same time, stock market wealth and incomes 
for the highest-paid Americans have risen.2 
Against this backdrop, the pay practices of 
the nation’s largest private employer have 
come under increased scrutiny. Walmart, 
with 1.3 million U.S. employees and $17 bil-
lion in annual profits, sets standards for all 
other retailers and across the supply chain 
of one of the nation’s fastest growing indus-
tries.3 Walmart’s practices impact the public 
sector and taxpayers as well when employ-
ees earn too little to meet their needs and re-
quire public assistance.4 Finally, Walmart is 
a leader in promoting an employment model 
in which workers earn too little to generate 
the consumer demand that supports hiring 
and would lead to economic recovery. In the 
last year, Walmart employees themselves 
have been increasingly vocal in protesting 
their low pay. Since the last holiday season, 
Walmart employees in stores throughout the 
country have repeatedly spoken out in pur-
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K E Y  P O I N T S
tWalmart workers and a growing num-
ber of community supporters are tak-
ing a stand this holiday season, calling 
for wage increases and sufficient hours 
on the job to earn the modest income 
of $25,000 a year. This brief explores 
one way to pay for raises. 
tWalmart spent $7.6 billion last year 
to buy back shares of its own stock. 
The buybacks did nothing to boost 
Walmart’s productivity or bottom 
line. If these funds were redirected 
to Walmart’s low-wage workers, they 
would each see a raise of $5.83 an hour. 
tCurtailing share buybacks would not 
damage the company’s competitiveness 
or raise prices for consumers. 
t If Walmart redirected its current 
spending to invest in its workforce, 
the benefits would extend to all stake-
holders in the company—customers, 
stockholders, taxpayers, employees and 
their families—and the economy as a 
whole.
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“Many managements 
have become so 
infatuated with how 
buybacks increase 
earnings per share that 
these distributions are 
crowding out sound 
business investments 
that create more 
value over time.”
suit of a modest wage goal: the equivalent of $25,000 
a year in wages for a full-time employee. 
Now as another holiday season approaches, this 
research brief considers one way Walmart could 
meet the wage target its employees are calling for—
without raising prices. We find that if Walmart redi-
rected the $7.6 billion it spends annually on repur-
chases of its own company stock, these funds could 
be used to give Walmart’s low-paid workers a raise 
of $5.83 an hour, more than enough to ensure that 
all Walmart workers are paid a wage equivalent to 
at least $25,000 a year for full-time work.5 Curtail-
ing share buybacks would not harm the company’s 
retail competitiveness or raise prices for consum-
ers. In fact, some retail analysts have argued that by 
providing a substantial investment in the company’s 
front-line workforce, higher pay could be expect-
ed to improve employee productivity and morale 
while reducing Walmart’s expenses related to em-
ployee turnover.6 With more money in their wallets, 
Walmart employees would likely spend a portion of 
the cash at Walmart itself, boosting the company’s 
sales. Sales might also increase as customers benefit 
from an improved shopping environment.7
In Dēmos’ prior study, “Retail’s Hidden Potential: 
How Raising Wages Would Benefit Workers, the In-
dustry and the Overall Economy,” we found that in-
creasing pay for low-wage workers at America’s larg-
est retailers would also have benefits for the economy 
as a whole, reducing poverty, boosting economic 
growth, and creating over 100,000 jobs. While the 
impact of raising wages at a single company—even 
one as large and central as Walmart—would have a 
much smaller impact, similar benefits could be ex-
pected from a wage increase: the economy would 
gain from the addition of economy-supporting jobs, 
taxpayers would pay less to subsidize Walmart’s low-
wage business model, and the company would no 
longer be the leading example of inequality in an 
economy being rapidly undermined by the shrink-
ing middle class and lack of purchasing power. Sig-
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nificantly, these gains could be 
attained without any impact on 
Walmart’s low prices. 
Share buybacks– $7.6 billion 
in 2012
Companies like Walmart that 
make enormous profits can use 
them to invest in the future of 
the business or to reward their 
investors. While using profits 
to invest in the retail workforce 
could lift up firms and the indus-
try, Walmart directs a substan-
tial share of its earnings toward 
share buybacks which benefit 
an increasingly narrow group of 
investors and do not provide the 
productivity benefits achieved by 
investing in workers. These buy-
backs occur when a company re-
purchases public shares of its own 
stock, which reduces the number 
of shares traded on the market so 
that the same level of earnings are 
distributed over fewer owners, 
making each remaining share 
worth more. Those owners who 
keep their stake in the company 
see the value of their holdings 
increase even if the company’s 
performance does not change. 
Walmart’s share buybacks fur-
ther consolidated ownership of 
the company in the hands of the 
heirs to company founder Sam 
Walton, increasing the Walton 
family stake in the corporation 
to above 50 percent. In addition, 
the buybacks increased the value 
of ownership among the Wal-
W A L M A R T  P R O F I T S
From the Poorest 
Stakeholders to the Wealthiest
T he six heirs of Sam Walton, founder of Walmart, are already among the world’s 
wealthiest people, with a combined net worth 
of $144.7 billion.12 In 2010, when the family’s 
fortune was worth “just” $89.5 billion, it was 
already greater than the total financial assets 
of the least-wealthy 41.5 percent of American 
families combined.13 Yet the Waltons’ wealth 
has continued to grow rapidly, even as most 
American families saw their assets erode 
during the Great Recession and stagnate 
during the nation’s halting economic recov-
ery. Last year, as many of the employees who 
make Walmart stores function each day were 
paid wages that kept their families below the 
poverty line, the Walton heirs took in an es-
timated $2.66 billion in dividend payments 
from their shares of Walmart stock.14
The two sides of the “Walmart family” are 
experiencing sharply divergent fortunes. On 
the one hand, the Walton heirs have inher-
ited wealth that expands each year. On the 
other, the workers who contribute to gener-
ating this wealth every day must often choose 
between buying food or keeping the electric-
ity on. This gap within the Walmart family of 
stakeholders is illustrative of business deci-
sions that drive economic inequality, depress 
consumer spending, and put the American 
Dream out of reach for many hardworking 
families. Walmart is far from the only com-
pany fueling this trend, but as the nation’s 
largest private employer, it has unparalleled 
ability to shift course and make the rest of the 
nation stand up and take notice.O
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tons and the other remaining shareholders. 
Yet buybacks did nothing to boost Walmart’s 
productivity or bottom line and had no direct 
benefit for Walmart’s customers or frontline 
employees. Despite the lack of productive 
benefit, massive share buybacks at Walmart 
have become a regular occurrence: according 
to data compiled by Bloomberg, Walmart has 
bought back about $36 billion in stock in its 
four previous fiscal years, while in June 2013 
announced a new $15 billion share repur-
chasing program at its annual shareholder 
meeting.8 
Even for investors, the intended benefi-
ciaries of a share buyback, the value of this 
financial maneuver is often illusory. As a 
prominent business analyst explained to the 
Wall Street Journal last year, “the evidence 
overwhelmingly shows that heavy buyback 
companies usually create less value for share-
holders over time… Many managements 
have become so infatuated with how buy-
backs increase earnings per share that these 
distributions are crowding out sound busi-
ness investments that create more value over 
time.”9
As an alternative to unproductive share 
buybacks, Walmart would benefit from in-
vesting instead in its frontline workforce. 
Assuming the highest recent estimate of the 
number of Walmart’s U.S. employees who are 
paid less than $25,000 a year—825,000 low-
paid workers on the company payroll10—$7.6 
billion could provide a raise of $5.83 an hour. 
This would be a genuinely life-changing pay 
increase for workers barely able to make ends 
meet. If we assume Walmart’s typical hourly 
worker making below the $25,000 per year 
threshold earns $9.06 an hour, the industry 
median for low-wage employees of large re-
tailers, then this would hike pay to $14.89 
an hour. At this rate, any worker placed on 
the schedule for more than 32 hours a week 
would be able to bring home $25,000 a year 
—an important accomplishment in an indus-
try where nearly a third of part-time employ-
ees say that they would like to work full-time 
if their employer would allow them.11 If, as 
other analysts have conjectured, the number 
of Walmart workers paid under $25,000 an-
nually is lower than 825,000, then each low-
paid employee could see a still larger raise. 
Walmart’s workers and their families would 
clearly be the biggest beneficiaries of a wage 
increase, but greater investment in the work-
force would benefit the company as well.
Higher pay at Walmart would benefit 
Walmart shoppers and the company’s 
bottom line
Despite Walmart’s size and retail clout, 
the company’s recent performance has dis-
appointed financial analysts.15 In its August 
earnings call, Walmart posted two quarters of 
declining same-store sales and reduced reve-
nue and earnings expectations for the coming 
fiscal year—including the holiday shopping 
season.16 In the last year, Walmart has come 
under criticism from business analysts for 
a range of problems related to underinvest-
ment in the company’s frontline workforce. 
According to media reports, U.S. consum-
ers have avoided Walmart’s stores because 
they are disorganized and shoppers cannot 
not find the items they seek on Walmart’s 
shelves.17 There were too few employees in 
the stores—or the workers who were present 
were too inexperienced—to keep items in 
stock and on the shelves. In February, leaked 
internal emails from Walmart’s corporate of-
fices lamented that “sales are a total disaster,” 
and wondered, “Where are all the customers? 
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And where’s their money?”18
In addition to bolstering its in-store 
workforce numbers, higher pay would pro-
vide an additional boost to customer expe-
rience, increasing worker productivity and 
encouraging employees to stay on the job 
long enough to become more experienced 
and helpful to customers. Nearly 500,000 
Walmart employees leave the company every 
year,19 a level of turnover that imposes direct 
costs to Walmart in terms of recruitment 
and training. Research from Harvard Busi-
ness School suggests that both profit mar-
gins and customer service are harmed by 
employee turnover, and that the damage can 
only be partially mitigated by management 
techniques.20 “When… ongoing operation-
al issues are handled by low-paid employees 
at understaffed stores, the consequences for 
operational execution can be severe,” notes 
MIT business professor Zeynep Ton.21
If Walmart were to invest the billions cur-
rently flowing to unproductive share buy-
backs in increased pay for frontline employ-
ees, the benefits of reduced turnover, higher 
employee productivity, better operating 
stores and improved customer satisfaction 
could be attained at no additional cost to cus-
tomers or to the company’s bottom line. 
Higher pay at Walmart 
would benefit America 
The actions of the nation’s largest pri-
vate employer have an outsized impact on 
America’s economy. Currently, all Ameri-
cans pay in multiple ways for the low-wage 
model: taxpayers pay to subsidize the surviv-
al of Walmart workers and their families, the 
macro economic recovery is stalled as cus-
tomers earn too little to generate the consum-
er demand that supports hiring, and growing 
inequality is corroding our civic and demo-
cratic institutions. While Walmart is far from 
the only large and profitable company to pay 
low wages,22 the corporation’s tremendous 
size and status as an industry leader put it in 
a unique position to perpetuate negative out-
comes for our nation—or to change course 
and lead the country in a new direction.
Walmart doesn’t pay many of its employ-
ees enough to afford the necessities of life 
—food, health coverage, housing and trans-
portation—effectively counting on taxpayers 
to make up the difference with food stamps, 
Medicaid, rental assistance and more. These 
subsidies add up quickly: a recent study by 
staff from the U.S. House of Representatives 
found that low wages at a single Wal-Mart 
store cost taxpayers in between $900,000 and 
$1.74 million every year.23 
At the same time, when profitable com-
panies like Walmart pay so little that their 
workers can’t afford to make ends meet, it un-
dermines the economy in a more profound 
way. Even with necessary public assistance, 
low-paid workers have insufficient resourc-
es to buy the basics. As a result, businesses 
(including Walmart itself) see lower sales. 
Companies without growing demand for 
their products or services resist hiring more 
workers, and unemployment remains high. 
The economic recovery sputters. As success-
ful business owner Nick Hanauer explained 
to the U.S. Senate Banking Committee: 
As an entrepreneur and inves-
tor, I have started or helped start, 
dozens of businesses and initially 
hired lots of people. But if no one 
could have afforded to buy what we 
had to sell, my businesses all would 
have failed and all those jobs would 
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have evaporated. That’s why I am so 
sure that rich business people don’t 
create jobs, nor do businesses, large 
or small. What does lead to more 
employment is a… feedback loop 
between customers and business-
es. And only consumers can set in 
motion this virtuous cycle of increas-
ing demand and hiring. That’s why 
the real job creators in America are 
middle-class consumers. The more 
money they have, and the more 
they can buy, the more people like 
me have to hire to meet demand.24 
The reality is that families living in or near 
poverty spend close to 100 percent of their 
income just to meet their basic needs, so 
when they receive an extra dollar in pay, they 
spend it on goods or services that were out 
of reach before. This ongoing unmet need 
makes low-income households more likely to 
spend new earnings immediately—channel-
ing any addition to their income right back 
into the economy, creating growth and jobs. 
When low-wage workers get a raise they 
come closer to becoming the middle-class 
consumers described by Hanauer, support-
ing increased sales, hiring, and economic re-
covery. 
Conclusion
Explaining its disappointing recent 
sales, Walmart Stores President and CEO 
Michael Duke blamed the challenging 
retail environment. But any retailer could 
have done that: Walmart alone has the size 
and industry clout to begin changing the 
climate, setting the retail industry and other 
employers on a higher-wage, higher-sales 
path. Simply reinvesting the funds used 
for share buybacks from Walmart’s richest 
stakeholders to its poorest would bring 
low-paid Walmart workers the raise they 
are calling for, improve worker productivity 
and sales, and not cost the company or its 
customers one additional dime. O
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Appendix: Methodology & Sources
As a public company, Walmart is subject to 
mandatory disclosure rules about company 
finances. Quarterly and annual expenditures 
on share repurchases are available for public 
review through the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) form 10-K. The hold-
ings of shareholders who own a 5 percent or 
greater stake in the company are disclosed 
to the SEC in the Schedule 14A proxy state-
ment, as are dividend payments per share of 
ownership. According to these documents, 
Walmart spent $7.6 billion in share repur-
chases during the fiscal year ending Janu-
ary 2013. The company’s 2013 annual report 
shows total spending of $36 billion in share 
repurchases in its four previous fiscal years.
Financial disclosure does not require 
Walmart to publish information related to 
employment practices including the wages 
and hours of its 1.3 million-member work-
force. Voluntary statements about employ-
ment opportunities within the company are 
directed broadly, incorporating information 
across worker populations and impeding 
analysis of specific worker categories. For 
example, the company’s website identifies an 
average wage for full time workers of $12.83 
per hour, including workers in higher-paid 
supervisory positions along with those in 
entry-level jobs but excluding part-time 
workers from the population counted in the 
average.25 In order to evaluate the cost and 
impact of low-wage labor at the firm, this 
brief relies on a combination of the compa-
ny’s voluntarily disclosed low-wage labor 
population and industry-wide average hours 
and median wages calculated from Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) data. 
In a September 2013 presentation to Gold-
man Sachs, Walmart U.S. CEO Bill Simon 
identified the low-wage labor force as a por-
tion of total employment at the firm, stat-
ing that more than 475,000 Walmart U.S. 
workers earned at least $25,000 in the past 
year. The presentation specifies that the pop-
ulation “includes every associate working at 
a U.S. location.” With 1.3 million workers 
employed by Walmart U.S., straightforward 
arithmetic provides a population count of 
825,000 workers earning below the thresh-
old. This population includes the temporary, 
part-time, and involuntarily part-time work-
ers excluded from the estimated average wage 
provided on the company website. Although 
spillover effects from a raise to $25,000 per 
year may affect a number of workers earning 
just above the new wage threshold, Walmart’s 
identification of low-wage workers at the 
$25,000 per year standard precludes esti-
mation of those workers within the affected 
upper bound. Due to the lack of data on the 
wage distribution within the firm, the spill-
over effects of a wage increase are not includ-
ed in this report. 
In lieu of estimated median earnings for 
the low-wage population, this brief applies 
industry standards calculated from the Cur-
rent Population Survey conducted by the 
BLS. Among all retailers with more than 
1,000 employees (the largest firm-size cate-
gory in the survey), the median year-round 
low-wage employee earns $9.06 per hour 
worked.26 The average work week indus-
try-wide is 31.6 hours.27 Walmart’s wage bill 
for a population of 825,000 workers earning 
below $25,000 per year is based on these es-
timates of median wages, average hours, and 
50 weeks of work per year.
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